This is an opinion from the Center.
When Donald Trump threatened Iranβs leaders late Saturday night that he would βobliterateβ the nationβs energy and oil infrastructure unless the Strait of Hormuz were reopened within 48 hours, he seemed determined to escalate the three-week-old conflict. But the previous day, the president had indicated that he was considering βwinding downβ the war and suggested that the U.S. was βgetting very closeβ to meeting its objectives.
Trump has always employed contradictory rhetoric as a political tool, allowing him to keep his options open and avoid committing to a specific course of action for as long as possible. But in most circumstances, those decisions are reversible. A government thatβs been shut down can be reopened. Legislation that he opposes can be tolerated and then embraced. Tariffs, investments, friendships, and marriagesβall are entirely negotiable.
But military engagement is often a one-way door. Once troops are deployed, they may face combat. Once they confront the enemy, they may be injured, captured, or killed. And by Sunday night, the president was rapidly approaching a rare decision that could not be undone, except at immense cost. It seemed as if Trump would either back up his previous demand with an escalation that would have caused extraordinary military and economic tumult, or he would invent an otherwise-indecipherable victory that ends the war, brings the troops home, and leaves Europe and the Gulf states to sift through the rubble both figuratively and literally.
But he did neither. Faced with a presidency-defining decision, Trump chose to take neither course of action and spoke vaguely of diplomatic progress, hinting at an approaching end to hostilities. But this type of non-decision is actually a decision too, one with not only vast consequences on the ground in the Middle East but potentially enormous political cost here at home as the midterm elections draw closer.
As this war approaches its one-month mark, Trump and his Republican allies face a decidedly unfriendly electoral landscape. The lack of motivation among the GOP faithful has caused their candidates great harm, as low turnout from their base has led to larger-than-expected defeats in last Novemberβs elections in Virginia and New Jersey and more recently in legislative races across the country. Polls continue to show that conservative voters, faced with stubborn inflation, unsatisfying investigations into Jeffrey Epsteinβs sordid conduct, rumored pullback of the administration's deportation efforts, and a surprisingly aggressive president who promised them an βAmerica Firstβ agenda, are predictably uninspired. Democratic voters, frightened and angry by what they see as Trumpβs intolerable excesses, are chomping at the bit.
If presidential elections are won or lost by persuading undecided voters, midterms are all about exciting the base. Trump is unquestionably our countryβs βExciter in Chief,β but right now he is certainly doing more to light a fire under his opponents than his allies. The president is very aware that a Democratic House majority means that he will almost certainly be impeached for a third time. He also knows that if the Democrats were to retake the Senate as well (still unlikely but much more plausible than six months ago), that would spell the end of the judicial confirmation conveyor belt that he has enjoyed since returning to office.
But the road to congressional majorities leads directly through the affordability debate. Inflation and the subsequent high costs of housing, healthcare, and groceries were Trumpβs biggest obstacle before Venezuela, Greenland, Iran, and Cuba, and the fighting in the Middle East all but guarantees that gas and electricity prices will continue to rise for the foreseeable future. So Trumpβs temptation to point to the damage that US and Israeli strikes have done to Iranβs military capabilities and declare victory is understandable.
But in addition to winning another election, Trump wants to win a war too. Leaving Iranβs ruling regime in power and allowing them to exercise control over Hormuz makes it harder for the White House to sell a persuasive triumph to a skeptical American electorate.
So there will not be a massive US escalation of the warβat least today. Trumpβs five-day negotiating window may or may not be met, but a decisive outcome to the war in either direction now looks even less likely. As a result, the political damage for Trump and his party will continue to mount.
Want to talk about this topic more? Join Dan for his webinar βThe Dan Schnur Political Report." And read more of Danβs writing at: www.danschnurpolitics.com.