Argument 1: Europe’s Defense Against Russia is, and Should Remain, NATO’s Core Mission
By Steven Pifer – Research Fellow, Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation; Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
In 1991, some 50 years after NATO’s establishment for the defense of Western Europe against a Soviet military threat, the Warsaw Pact disbanded and the Soviet Union collapsed. Taking office in 1993, President Bill Clinton and his administration saw an opportunity to reshape Europe and bridge the divides that had emerged after World War II. By late 1994, U.S. policy with regard to NATO envisaged a three-track approach.
The first track entailed enlargement. This was provided for by Article 10 of the NATO Treaty and was consistent with the goal of building a united and free Europe. Many former Warsaw Pact members sought NATO membership, and many in the West saw enlargement as a way to underpin the democratic and economic transitions in those countries. With uncertainties about how Russia might evolve, the Alliance provided an insurance policy.
The second track aimed to forge a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship. Clinton hoped to build positive relations with Russia — “an alliance with the Alliance” — in hopes that such a relationship could allay concerns in Moscow about enlargement. He asked, “What if Russia sought membership?” His staff advised that Russia should be considered if it met the Alliance’s criteria, including military, economic and political reform. However, Moscow appeared to see NATO as “the United States and everyone else”, and being one of everyone else held little appeal for the Kremlin. It instead pursued the idea of a special NATO-Russia relationship.
The third track dealt with Ukraine. A NATO-Ukraine partnership would solidify links between Kyiv, the capital city formerly known as Kiev (Kyiv), and the West. This would address Kyiv’s concerns about being left in a gray zone of insecurity between the Alliance and Russia, and encourage Ukraine’s reform efforts.
The New Strategy’s Promising Start
The tracks came together in 1997. In May, Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with NATO leaders in Paris for the signature of the “Founding Act” on NATO-Russia relations. Among other things, the document contained two key security assurances for Russia: first, NATO had “no intention, no plan, and no reason” to deploy nuclear arms in new member states, and second, NATO did not envisage “the additional permanent stationing of substantial [conventional] combat forces” in new members.
That July, in Madrid, NATO leaders invited Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to become members. The “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership” between NATO and Ukraine also was signed, strengthening links between NATO and Kyiv. They would join the Alliance in time to take part in NATO’s 50th-anniversary summit in April 1999.
The 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001 led NATO to invoke Article 5 (an attack against one “shall be considered” an attack against all). In addition to enlargement and stabilization operations in the Balkans, the Alliance began sending troops to support the U.S. military in Afghanistan.
The NATO-Russia relationship, which had suffered a setback in 1999 due to Russian anger over Alliance air strikes against Serbia for its ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, got a restart in May 2002. President Vladimir Putin met NATO leaders in Rome and agreed to expand on and strengthen the Founding Act, including consultations on certain issues on the basis of individual NATO member positions, not an agreed Alliance position. NATO’s then-Secretary General George Robertson recalled that Putin even asked about joining NATO, but indicated that he did not want to wait in line and go through the process required of other applicants.
Later that year, NATO leaders invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join. They did so in 2004. Putin and the Kremlin expressed little objection to the 2002 membership invitations. By 2021, NATO would number 30 members, up from the 16 it comprised in 1991. Russian attitudes subsequently hardened, however, and Russia fiercely opposed requests by Ukraine and Georgia for membership action plans in 2008.
Talks Falter and Animosity Returns
In Europe, NATO members nevertheless continued the process begun in the early 1990s of reducing their nuclear and conventional force capabilities. The U.S. force presence in Europe shrank to less than one-fourth the size of its Cold War numbers. Aside from small squadrons of fighter aircraft providing a Baltic air policing mission and a missile defense site in Romania, NATO had no real military presence on the territory of new members prior to 2014.
Russia’s military seizure of Crimea and its use of so-called “separatists” to provoke a conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014 prompted a true breakdown in NATO-Russia relations. The Alliance suspended all practical cooperation. (The suspension of all cooperation was a mistake; one rationale for a NATO-Russia relationship was to have a mechanism to jointly manage crises.)
After two decades of force reductions, NATO leaders agreed at their Wales summit in September 2014 to strengthen their defense capabilities. They pledged to boost members’ defense spending to at least 2 percent of gross domestic product by 2024. Given concerns, especially in Poland and the Baltic states, about aggressive Russian actions, NATO deployed multinational battlegroups to each of the four countries. The U.S. Army deployed an additional brigade and prepositioned equipment for a second brigade in the region.
As Russia continued its low-intensity war against Ukraine, NATO took further steps to bolster its deterrent and defense posture. Moscow ignored NATO offers in 2020 and 2021 to convene the NATO-Russia Council, and NATO-Russia relations went into a tail-spin. In October 2021, Russia announced the suspension of its mission in Brussels and effectively closed the NATO mission in Moscow.
Why NATO Must Stay Its Course
The Kremlin is unhappy with NATO enlargement, but enlargement critics in the West may well overstate how much it contributed to the decline in West-Russia relations. Russian pressure on Ukraine prior to the Maidan Revolution was intended to dissuade Kyiv from deepening integration with the European Union; the Ukrainian government then had ruled out drawing closer to NATO.
Critics also appear to downplay the impact of Russian domestic politics on Kremlin policy. In retrospect, Washington and NATO underestimated the degree of antipathy in Moscow towards the Alliance, and NATO had no way to deal with the domestic political factors driving the Kremlin policy. During Vladimir Putin’s first years as president, when a growing economy provided a strong basis for regime legitimacy, NATO enlargement did not seem to trouble him. He termed the 2002 enlargement “no tragedy.” However, as the Russian economy began to stagnate, he could no longer cite rising living standards as justification for his continued rule. He began to stress nationalism, particularly when returning to the presidency in 2011-2012. He recast Russia as a great power reestablishing its position on the global stage, and called for a more aggressive foreign policy — all themes that resonated with much of his domestic constituency. This construction increasingly depicted the United States and NATO in adversarial terms.
NATO should ensure that its readiness and capability to act in defense of member states is not in doubt, to avoid any miscalculation by the Kremlin. At the same time, the Alliance should leave the door open for dialogue, even though Moscow appears uninterested, at least for now. The possibility of a Russian military attack on a NATO member is considered low, though the prospect would have been put at zero 10 years ago. While the primary motive for enlargement was to underpin democratic transitions, new members now breathe a sigh of relief that they have the protection of Article 5. NATO has come full circle over the past 30 years; its central purpose again centers on deterrence and collective defense against a threat on its eastern border.
Argument 2: As America’s Dominance Fades, Europeans Should Defend Europe
By Doug Bandow – Senior Fellow, Cato Institute; Former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan
America’s Prolonged Stay in Europe
With U.S. foreign policy in flux, it is time to fundamentally rethink the transatlantic alliance. Two months ago, America’s Global War on Terror ingloriously ended with the collapse of the U.S.- and NATO-supported government in Afghanistan. Although terrorism remains an issue, the roughly three decades of American global dominance — Washington’s brief “What we say goes” era — is over. This transformation will affect more than the U.S. response to terrorism. America can no longer manage every region on earth and protect every prosperous and populous ally, including in Europe. Washington should begin shedding rather than just sharing security burdens.
Foreign policy is strongly circumstantial. When the transatlantic alliance was formed in 1949, the world was radically different: Western Europe was still recovering from World War II, Eastern Europe was occupied by the Red Army, and Joseph Stalin ruled the Soviet Union. As Lord Hastings Ismay, the first secretary-general of NATO famously explained, the alliance’s purpose was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”
However, America’s presence, though initially essential, was expected to be limited. Indeed, the U.S. deployment was intended to foster allied self-sufficiency, not make Washington’s role permanent. Dwight Eisenhower, the first supreme commander of NATO, said the objective was to help “these people regain their confidence and get on their own military feet.” He explicitly rejected the U.S. being “a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions.” Yet that is what America became — and remains today.
The Transformation of NATO
The global balance of power has shifted dramatically, and the need for a U.S.-dominated transatlantic alliance has disappeared. Instead of promoting NATO’s expansion, the Biden Administration should be plotting the alliance’s transformation. That would conveniently coincide with increased European interest in greater continental military capabilities. For decades, successive U.S. administrations discouraged member governments from developing forces separate from the alliance. Today such a shift should be Washington’s objective.
The U.S. remains the world’s most important nation — largest economy, greatest soft power, dominant military. However, America’s edge in those areas is shrinking. And its weaknesses, compounding extraordinarily bitter political divisions with equally dramatic fiscal irresponsibility, are significant. Washington cannot forever underwrite wealthy states which have other priorities, such as investing in their own welfare states, as in Europe.
Moreover, allied relationships would be healthier if more equal. American demands that European governments do more, but only in ways seen as most advantageous in Washington, have undermined the transatlantic relationship. Donald Trump’s verbal eruptions on the issue differed only in tone from the rhetoric of his predecessors. Illustrating predictable hubris, Washington long has instructed the Europeans on the sort of militaries it believes they should maintain.
A European Solution to a European Problem
The basic problem is that there is agreement neither on the degree of threat nor the most appropriate response. Many NATO members see no serious dangers, and even those nations which worry about Russia, the only meaningful military threat to Europe, still mostly rely on Washington. Consider the Baltic countries: they claim to fear aggression by Moscow but devote just a couple of cents on the Euro to defense. Do they really value their independence so little? They should spend far more and create a territorial defense that would exact a high price for Russian aggression.
The solution is simple, if perhaps expensive for European states. They should assess the risks, decide on the objectives, and create the force structure necessary to achieve the latter. The U.S. should aid them in this process, giving the Europeans time to decide on the mode of organization and address existing military deficiencies. However, Washington — and especially the present administration, known for its Atlanticist orientation — should take the lead.
The Need for European Military Independence after Afghanistan
If a further spur is needed for action, it should be the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan. In August, European defense ministers gathered, complaining of a “fiasco” and “debacle.” They had no independent ability to act but were stuck relying on the U.S. In this, they had no one to blame but themselves. Europe’s military deficiencies have been long known. Recently, The Center for American Progress concluded: “European militaries have now experienced decades of decline… European forces aren’t ready to fight with the equipment they have, and the equipment they have isn’t good enough.” Some European leaders believe that the tragic embarrassment of Afghanistan will finally, after a multitude of promises and false starts, lead to genuine change. For instance, E.U. commissioner Paolo Gentiloni, a former Italian prime minister, opined, “It’s a terrible paradox, but this debacle could be the start of Europe’s moment.” That is possible but will require a serious continental approach to security not seen since NATO’s formation.
French President Emmanuel Macron famously proposed “strategic autonomy” and a “true European army” after attacking NATO as “brain dead.” That idea went nowhere. However, the European Union’s de facto foreign minister, Josep Borrell, has now suggested an “initial entry force” of 5,000 soldiers and other “new tools” like it. At least this would be progress, but still would be only a tiny first step. The British and French forces are capable, though small if the defense of Europe is the objective. In contrast, Germany has skimped on spending even as the Bundeswehr has attracted significant embarrassing criticism for its lack of readiness. Italy and Spain have large economies but little interest in creating more effective militaries. And, as noted earlier, even the Baltics and Poland spend far less than their rhetorical warnings of the alleged threat would seem to warrant. This ridiculous state of affairs exists only because Washington plays an oversize role in Europe’s defense. It is better for European states to concentrate on security issues at home. Whatever Europe chooses to do, Washington should drop its promise to intervene.
For European governments, reliance on America has always been the easy path. However, that strategy will increasingly be a dead end. Both politics and economics are moving against Washington’s continued acquiescence to European cheap-riding. It certainly is not in America’s interest. Ultimately, it is not in Europe’s interest either.
Steven Pifer is a William J. Perry Research Fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation as well as a non-resident senior fellow with the Brookings Institution. Pifer’s research focuses on nuclear arms control, Ukraine, Russia, and European security. A retired Foreign Service officer, his more than 25 years with the State Department included assignments as deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs with responsibilities for Russia and Ukraine, ambassador to Ukraine, and special assistant to the president and senior director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia on the National Security Council. He also served at the U.S. embassies in Warsaw, Moscow and London as well as with the U.S. delegation to the negotiation on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Geneva.
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He previously was affiliated with the Heritage Foundation and Competitive Enterprise Institute. He is a columnist for American Conservative online, American Spectator online, and Antiwar.com. He has been published in such periodicals as Foreign Policy, Orbis, and National Interest, as well as leading newspapers including the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. His books include Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire and Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World. He received his J.D. from Stanford University in 1979 and is a member of the California and District of Columbia bars.